

659

28 July 13

C.P.O.

To the
Military Secretary
of His Ex.^y
The Gov.^r General
Atchuterie
Colony? Brazil
Rev. of work force.
28th Feb 13.



it would be depopulating a Country
which you purpose to possess - I do
not mean that villages decidedly
hostile should be spared; but many
have only had Robson's choice - and I
am told by Mr. Petersgill, that their
almost universal Character (I speak of
those on this side the Forest only) is a love
of agriculture, and a patient submission

to the Indians, wherever they may be.
Anxiously expecting to hear
from you, I remain

my D. Doyle

very faithfully

J. Hamilton

Excuse bad writing for I am really ill -

we take ground to the N.W. tomorrow
- only about Three Miles -

The Kings 17th and 25th N.I. arrived at
Pettah yesterday and will join us on
the 2nd March - The 14th crossed from
Dinapore on the 24th but for that
purpose all these are coming I cannot
devise - to attempt the Hills appears
to be totally out of the question - the
enemy will not wait for us in the
Jungle, and surely such a force cannot
be necessary to sweep the Terai -
even supposing that Lord Mavor should
sanction such a measure - which,
upon mature deliberation, I cannot
think he will; as independent of
humanity (for which his Lordship's
name is justly exalted in every corner
of the globe) I conceive it would be
politically wrong - in as much as

Camp Banjan Pokra
28th Feb 1858.

My Dear Doyle

I almost hate the thought
of sitting down to address you, because
I have ^{been} invariably the Herald of disaster
or disappointment - Of the former,
however, thank God, ^{there is} nothing near to
communicate - On the contrary
there was a neat little affair in this
vicinity on the 20th in which a
handful of Amateur Officers, charged,
and routed a considerable body of the
Enemy - amongst them, I am told,
Lasement and Stewart were very
conspicuous - there also are named
with deserved praise - of these, young
Murray of the irregular Horse, is
spoken of as having charged more

than once through the Gorkas, before
his people could be persuaded to follow
him - after which they did great
execution - at Kikens Kill (on whom
they made the first approach)
appears to have conducted himself
with much resolution & judgement

The next day our new Commander
arrived. when the natural and common
expectation was, that our recent success
would be followed up by an immediate
advance - so far from it, ~~that~~ his
first act plainly indicated that he
had no intention of attempting the
Kills this Season - in short he sent
away such Ordnance, and ordnance
stores, as would have been indispensably
requisite for that undertaking - I have

this from Major Mason - for I have only
seen the General in my visit of ceremony
on the day of his arrival, having been
confined ever since by severe indisposition

My last letter would tell you of our
late leader's very abrupt departure - at
that time I felt for the Man, tho' I despised
the Officer - since then I have heard
some reports about the Peasants, which,
if true, would change my pity into strong
indignation -

Quid non mortalia pectora cogis

Auri sacra fames!

I sat down with the intention of
writing a long letter; but have been
so frequently interrupted by the villainous
or rather feminine custom of paying morning
visits, with their cursed "Chokras", that
the ferrous scribendi is quite gone -



THE BRITISH PHILATELIC ASSOCIATION

LIMITED (BY GUARANTEE)

For the protection and help of all interested in stamp collecting

3 BERNERS STREET, OXFORD STREET, LONDON, W.1

Telephone : Museum 7564 (4 lines)

Joint Secretaries : C. McNeil Greig
I. R. Hall

Assistant Secretary: Miss W. G. Worsell

As from:

ROBSON LOWE LIMITED,
50 Pall Mall, S.W.1.

2nd May 1962.

Major General Sir Frederick Gwatkin, C.B., D.S.O., M.C.,
Cherrybank, Roundwell,
Nr. Maidstone, Bearsted,
Kent.

Dear Sir Frederick,

At the B.P.A. Meeting yesterday, we examined your covers and had a long discussion on them. We came to the conclusion that it was impossible to give a Certificate at the present moment, but we are not unduly suspicious.

As far as the type is concerned, there is no doubt that it was set off from movable type. We cannot find anything quite like the letter "M". However, the "P" is "C.P.O." type seems to match other movable type which we have seen.

As far as the ink is concerned, there is no doubt that both come from the same source as one would expect. The rather wet consistency is similar to that used for the Mey War Field Force although the copy with which we have compared it is dated 1833 - eighteen years after your letter. We also have a soldier's letter from Dr. Parsons which has a framed "TRICHINOPOLY, POST FREE" which could be well struck in the identical ink.

P.T.O.



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Continued:

We have been in touch with Mr. Hammond Giles in India and I am enclosing a copy of his letter of the 24th April which may well interest you.

To sum up, if the Committee gave their opinion it would be on the following lines:

"The Committee is unable to express a definite opinion on the hand-stamps struck on the 1815 covers as apparently these have not been previously chronicled. However, having compared the ink and type used, they can find no reason to be suspicious of their authenticity."

I am sorry that this is the best that we can do for you in this instance but I am sure you will understand.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

RL/BD.

Encs. Registered.



= Sakurpur
NW of Baragahin

just in front of Parsa. The army arrived at the southern bank of the Great Gandak on 6 December. Because the rains had been so late, the river was still about 100 yards wider than normal, and even the elephants could not ford it. As there were only seven or eight boats at the ghat, getting the army across might have taken many days had it not been for the ingenuity of the Field-Engineer, Captain Tickell, and the co-operation of a local indigo planter, Mr. Moran. With the help of large coils of rope, cast-iron weights, large slabs of rock from the indigo factory vat and plenty of manpower—all provided by Mr. Moran—a long pier-head was constructed to join a bridge laid over the boats and the whole force with all its baggage and camp followers brought across the river in one and a half days. By 19 December it was encamped at Lauban, two miles from the forest and slightly west of Baragahi.

Marley was preoccupied as he approached the frontier. News of

the harassment of the advance posts convinced him that he must enter the hills quickly; but at the same time he was very reluctant to do this without the battering train, which would not arrive at Betya for over a week. The root of his predicament was Bradshaw's premature establishment of the line of frontier posts. Marley felt that he had insufficient troops to reinforce them, and he would rather have protected the Tarai by advancing into the hills with his whole force and monopolizing the enemy's attentions. Bradshaw, however, having issued a proclamation to the border inhabitants which pledged them British protection, was now unwilling to have the posts withdrawn, and the Major-General was not resolute enough to contradict an officer whom he had been specially instructed to consult. He therefore silenced his misgivings, hoping that the confident reports of the officers in advance were well founded, and allowed the posts to remain as they were pending the arrival of the battering train. They were to serve as bases for his projected three columns of invasion. But after he had entered the hills they were to be garrisoned by a levy of irregular militia.

On 30 December, when the heavy ordnance had at length joined the field train at Betya and the whole of the artillery was preparing to move forward to Parsa, news was received from Captain Sibley, in charge of that post. He wrote that the enemy were gathered in some force in his front and seemed to be meditating an attack. The tone of Sibley's note was almost casual, and apparently he did not even request a reinforcement; but the Major-General's suppressed

apprehensions at once revived, and he immediately sent four companies of sepoy to strengthen him. Under the command of Major Greenstreet, they left camp at three o'clock in the morning of 31 December.

Henry Sibley was brave and very cocksure. He was so confident of his ability to drub the Nepalis that when he received a note from Greenstreet on 31 December, informing him of the approach of the reinforcement, he did not even bother to send a reply. Greenstreet, who was as obtuse as Sibley was self-assured, consequently saw no reason to hurry, and halted on the road for the night.

Sibley's force consisted of about 360 men, including fifty of Gardner's Horse. Besides the six-pounder, he had a small one and a half-pounder mountain gun. Finding the mud fort of Parsa too small to accommodate all his men, he had neglected altogether to use this, and taken up a position farther north. His camp was spread along the western bank of a deep nulla. Serried sal forest enclosed it to the front and left. No situation could have been more manifestly perilous; yet Sibley had remained there for two weeks without taking any measures to make it more defensible. No trenches had been dug; no forest had been cleared. He had not even posted look-out men in the trees. The enemy had excellent cover to well within gunshot of the camp on both its northern and western approaches. The advanced pickets, in fact, were merely a few yards from the forest. The only precaution he had taken on the night of 31 December, when Lieutenant Smith warned him of an imminent enemy attack, was to put all his men under arms. He was too busy with New Year's Eve celebrations to do more.

What appeared to be myriads of Nepalis emerged from the jungle half an hour before daybreak on 1 January. Officers later swore that they had counted five battalions of regulars alone. There were also numerous elephants mounted with *jingals* (large matchlocks on pivots, each throwing a two-pound ball). The main body swept round the left flank and attacked the British rearguard, which contained the officers' tents, the magazine and the bazaar, but which was protected only by the fifty irregular horsemen. These were soon overpowered, and the enemy rushed among the tents and grabbed the stores and ammunition. Simultaneously, other parties attacked the advance guard and inserted themselves between the right flank and the nulla. Smith was commanding the pickets in the front, which were pelted with an obliterating fire. He called up the

then he formally surrendered his military command to Marley and turned southwards to meet the Major-General.

Major Bradshaw in Saran and Major Roughsedge in Tirhut having already deprived him of some 1,750 men, Marley's army was less than 5,000 strong when he finally left Dinapur. Of these approximately 900 were Europeans, comprising artillery and the King's 24th Regiment of Foot.² To this army was assigned the most important role in the Governor-General's grand strategic scheme. It was to seize the enemy capital and impose those terms of submission which the Calcutta government had judged essential for its own security. The route of its advance was left to Marley's discretion; but it would be an important object in his operations to secure the three forts in the first range of hills which commanded the principal passes to the plains—Hethaura, Harharpur, and Makwanpur.

↑ 30 m SSE of Khaty

The service now entrusted to you [wrote the Adjutant-General] is of a peculiarly important nature. We are about to engage in hostilities with a new power, whose insolence and aggression have defied us to arms. The maintenance of the established renown of our country in Asia, the future security of a vast proportion of our dominions, and the prevention of future wars of a similar character will greatly depend on a speedy and successful issue to the approaching contest. Of all the operations now in progress against Nepal, none can more effectively contribute towards bringing about such an issue than the accomplishment of the important and honorable part assigned to you in the general plan.

At first it was considered both impracticable and unnecessary to send heavy battering ordnance with Marley's column; but further information representing the road to Makwanpur to be less difficult than had been supposed and a prudent lesson being drawn, no doubt, from events in the west, a siege train was ordered from Cawnpore to Betiya. Marley was to use this if the need became apparent after he had entered the hills.

The supreme importance of his mission naturally caused Hastings to follow Marley's progress with special attention; but this was not the only reason for his scrutiny. While it is true that his choice of generals had been very limited, there nevertheless remained in Calcutta a very eligible officer, whom Hastings personally preferred to Marley but whom he had felt bound to pass

² Later the South Wales Borderers.

over because he was Marley's junior and not on the general staff. This was Major-General George Wood, known after forty-three years' prominent service in the east as 'the Royal Bengal Tiger'. His part in the capture of Java had been less conspicuous only than Gillespie's and had earned him a gold medal and the praise of the Prince Regent. He was a much more impressive figure than Marley, an obscure old general who had risen without drama or special distinction, merely as a result of the inexorable workings of the seniority system. Hastings was distinctly predisposed in Wood's favour. 'Let me assure you that your character is too well known to me for it to be possible that I should not have you in contemplation when I look forward to Staff appointments', he wrote to him in November 1814.³ It seems certain that the principal command in Nepal would have been given to Wood had the Governor-General not been concerned to avoid an invidious supersession.

But if Hastings was not the man to allow personal predilections to outweigh the preference due to seniority, neither was he one of those men whose concern to act with scrupulous fairness makes them distrust even their own judgement where the object of their prejudice is concerned. On the contrary, his sympathy for George Wood made him eager to discover such lapses in Marley's conduct as might justify his replacement.



As luck would have it, Marley's army was detained at Dinapur for two weeks beyond the date fixed for its departure. Its supply of treasure was late in arriving at the rendezvous, and Marley did not care to march until he had the means of paying his men. Hastings chafed at the delay, complaining of Marley's dawdling, and asked George Wood to hold himself in readiness for immediate service. 'Wherever you may be placed, I can assure you of my full dependence on you.'⁴ He obviously did not expect that it would be long before an opportunity to dismiss Marley presented itself.

Marley finally crossed the Ganges at the end of November, aiming to move to Baragarhi, the central point in Bradshaw's advanced line of defences. To save time, the field guns, stores and engineering equipment were sent directly to the western end of this line, by way of Betiya, because it was Marley's intention to enter the hills with his main force through the Bichakori pass, which was

³ Printed in Mrs. F. M. Montague, *Memorials of the Family of Wood of Largo*. Both Marley and Wood were Company officers.

⁴ Ibid.

THE BOCES (C.)
13 M. N of
N. border
where?



wned while trying to swim to safety. It was estimated that about fifty Nepalis lost their lives in this way alone. The total killed was reckoned at seventy-eight, and twenty-three were taken prisoner.

Among the latter was the *vakil* Chandra Sekhar Upadhyaya, who was captured early in the action. All the property in his possession, including the presents destined for the Governor-General, was seized as plunder and shared among the troops of the detachment; and Bradshaw, thinking that he might prove a useful diplomatic pawn, decided to retain Chandra Sekhar himself in his camp. The *vakil* earnestly assured him that neither he nor his masters had ever seriously expected a British invasion, and he begged to be allowed to write to the Raja to inform him of the gravity of his situation. Permission was granted, and under Bradshaw's invigilation he penned a forlorn dispatch, describing the calamity at Barharwa and counselling the Raja to open negotiations immediately.

But the durbar at Kathmandu, apprised of British reverses in Dehra Dun, was less pessimistic. Bhim Sen Thapa's reaction to the news of the attack on Barharwa was not to sue for peace, but to affect an attitude of high indignation. He shrilly resented Bradshaw's seizure of the *vakil* and his property, claiming that it constituted a scandalous violation of the basic ethics of diplomacy. Hastings dismissed these protestations. Chandra Sekhar had been informed of the nature of the relations between the two countries, apparently possessed no authority to treat for peace, and had been given ample time to withdraw to Kathmandu. By remaining on the frontier he had forfeited all right to diplomatic immunity.

Baragarhi, the objective of the centre detachment under Captain Hay, was about twelve miles in advance of Bradshaw's headquarters. It was a large rectangular mud fort, of some importance since it was the winter residence of the *Saba* of Makwanpur. Although it was known to be garrisoned by only fifty or sixty men, it was appreciated that its high ramparts and deep ditch would be formidable obstacles, and a field gun was placed at Hay's disposal. The route, though short, was intersected by numerous nullas, and it was not until eight in the morning that Hay reached the place. Its occupants were on the ramparts, apparently intending to resist, so operations were postponed until the six-pounder arrived. Meanwhile Hay parleyed with the *Faujdar*,¹ and while their leader was

¹ An official subordinate to a *saba*, combining the functions of magistrate and revenue collector.

13 M. N. of border

thus engaged, all the Nepalis in the fort absconded by scaling the back wall. The gun was not necessary after all.

Lieutenant Smith, who marched to occupy Parsa, twenty miles to Hay's left, did not even see the enemy. When he arrived at the mud fort, after a march of twelve hours, he found its dilapidated works ghostly and abandoned—though spies soon brought word that there was a Nepali force lurking in the forest a couple of miles in front. With the capture of this post Bradshaw's plan was all but accomplished, and it only remained to tidy his row of advanced posts by moving forward two companies of sepoy from Barharwa, which was on a latitude somewhat behind that of the other two positions, to the village of Samanpur, which was more nearly aligned with them. This done, Bradshaw declared the Tarai of Saran to be occupied, and called on the inhabitants to submit to the Company's authority.

Despite its immediate success, the wisdom of Bradshaw's tripartite advance was very dubious. His three advanced posts—Parsa, Baragarhi and Samanpur—were widely separated; they had no support, because the main army had been delayed and had not yet even crossed the Ganges; and they were in continuous danger of attack from enemy bands prowling in the jungle. By setting up these positions at this stage in the campaign, he had exceeded the letter of his instructions and had, furthermore, infringed a regulation of 1806, which decreed that field guns should always be detached in pairs. There was a single six-pounder with each of the detachments in advance. Nevertheless, he and the officers under his command were publicly congratulated by the Commander-in-Chief on their success.

It was not long before the serious dangers of Bradshaw's arrangement became apparent. Early in December, Lieutenant Smith, in charge of the western post at Parsa, became positive that he was about to be attacked by a superior enemy force, and he hurriedly withdrew to join Hay. His arrival was timely, because on 7 December the pickets in front of Baragarhi were involved in a skirmish with the enemy, and three sepoy were killed. But as the main army was by then at last approaching the frontier, Bradshaw decided not to abandon any of his positions. He made a march along the frontier, re-deploying his force so that Captain Blackney was left in charge at Samanpur, Captain Hay at Baragarhi, and the post at Parsa re-established with a stronger force under Captain Sibley.

12 M. E. but
5 E. wide N.